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Summary
This paper analyses the strategies of four humanitarian agencies which have been
engaged in humanitarian work in Sri Lanka since the start of the war in 1983 and
explores the ways in which humanitarian agencies engage with the combatants in
a 'complex political emergency'. The paper focuses on the challenges and
dilemmas which these agencies have faced in relation to the two sets of
combatants: the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). Focusing the period from 1995 to 1998, the study draws on case data on
two Norwegian non-governmental organisations Forut and Redd Barna, and two
British NGOs Oxfam and Save the Children Fund (UK).
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Introduction
This paper discusses the strategies which humanitarian agencies adopt when they
take up the challenge of advocacy in addition to service delivery. When agencies
engage in advocacy the potential for confrontation with the combatants increases.
Consequently, access to populations in need may be jeopardised. The paper
identifies mechanisms for balancing service delivery with advocacy. I also discuss
organisational implications of moving beyond service delivery. The paper is based
on extensive interviews with several humanitarian agencies working in the North
of Sri Lanka.
Internal displacement and response strategies
Since the war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri
Lankan government started in July 1983, people have sought refuge in safer
areas in Sri Lanka, India and the West. In the 1990s the number of displaced
people in Sri Lanka fluctuated between roughly 500,000 and 1 million. In addition,
an estimated 600,000 Tamils have left for India and the West (Gunaratna 1998:
301). Compared to the 1981 census figures, which put the number of Tamils at a
little more than 3 million, these figures mean that half the Tamil population has
become either displaced or refugees.
It has been argued that humanitarian aid is in crises and that agencies need to
rethink their responses and strategies. One argument maintains that humanitarian
aid agencies should ‘stick to the knitting’, that is remain strictly humanitarian, and
the key concern of the agencies should be the needs of the recipients (Halliday
19971, ICRC 1996). This is a view which has been coined ‘humanitarian
minimalism’ (Slim 1997a: 2). According to this view NGOs should develop
standards and codes of conduct for their work in conflict situations in order to deal
with problems of neutrality and impartiality.2
The opposite argument says that humanitarian agencies have to widen their focus
in three respects. Firstly, they should link relief and development (IDS Bulletin
1994, UNHCR 1995). Secondly, agencies should work towards integrating relief
with human rights and conflict resolution, and make sure that aid does not fuel the
conflict dynamic (Anderson 1995, 1996). Thirdly, their service delivery work
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should be complemented by lobbying and advocacy work (Clark 1991, Penrose
1994, ICRC 1999). In this paper I discuss the implications for humanitarian
agencies of this third proposition.
The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka
The humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka have been implementing a ‘cross line’
operation from the mid-1980s. Humanitarian aid has been brought in from
government-controlled areas and reloaded at the Forward Defence Line, which
demarcates the areas under government control from areas under the control of
the LTTE. Once inside LTTE-controlled areas, aid has been distributed jointly
between the local administration, foreign humanitarian agencies and local
organisations. The relief operation has over the years been characterised by
stability and the large agencies operating in the North have been the same
throughout the conflict: Oxfam, Save the Children Fund (SCF), Redd Barna,
Forut, Care, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC).
The LTTE and the government agree on the overall framework for provision of
assistance to displaced and economically affected people. Tamils living in LTTE
held areas are considered Sri Lankan citizens both by the government and by the
LTTE. Both parties agree that it is the responsibility of the Sri Lankan government
to provide assistance to them. From the government’s point of view, this
arrangement secures government links with the population in LTTE-held areas.
From LTTE’s point of view, government involvement and responsibility ensures
that the LTTE does not have to carry the responsibility for providing aid to the
displaced population.
Consequently, the Sri Lankan government has played an active role in delivering
services during the conflict. It has provided dry rations to war affected people,
although the amounts which have been delivered have often fallen short of
international standards. When asked, government officials argue that rations are
delivered to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Tamil people and to maintain a
government presence in the North. On the other hand, the government is
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concerned that aid may fall into the hands of the LTTE. Supplies are therefore
kept at a minimum and agency access is severely restricted.
The administration in the North of Sri Lanka consists of a skeleton government
presence and an LTTE ‘shadow’ administration or departments. This ‘dual’
administration constitutes a de facto LTTE-administration. The ‘shadow’ LTTE-
administration carries out its own activities and monitors the activities of the
government, the foreign humanitarian agencies and the Tamil people. LTTE
effectively controls the activities of the government administration through subtle
influence, backed by force and brutal assassinations. The government
administration has restricted its operations to distribution of relief and the payment
of salaries and pensions and an economic embargo has effectively kept economic
and developmental activities in the North at a minimum level.
During the early 1990s the LTTE built up its relief arm, the Tamil Rehabilitation
Organisation, which was administered under the political wing of the LTTE. The
LTTE saw the role of TRO as one of co-ordinating the humanitarian agencies in
the Vanni as well as implementing its own relief work.  Agency policies with regard
to TRO range from rejection of implementation through TRO in principle, to
pragmatic implementation through TRO on the grounds that TRO is the most
effective implementing agency. In the middle are some agencies which
implement through TRO in order to maintain a good working relationship with the
LTTE:
In order to maintain the understanding with the LTTE, all the INGOs have
chosen to appease the TRO to some extent by letting some projects be
implemented by them...If one chooses to implement all projects oneself,
the TRO will be dissatisfied and problems may occur with local authorities
[LTTE]. If too many projects are implemented by TRO, this will be
problematic in relation to the government who regards TRO involvement
as having close ties with the LTTE. In other words working in the Vanni
involves a difficult balancing act between the two authorities.3
The agencies have a multifaceted relationship to the LTTE. On the one hand, they
generally have a good working relationship in terms of security arrangements.
They are also often able to agree on priorities for the work of the agencies. On the
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other hand, agencies often experience undue pressure from the LTTE. Firstly,
LTTE wants the agencies to bring in as much material resources as possible and
to use the resources in areas, and for projects, which the LTTE suggests.
Secondly, LTTE applies pressure on the agencies to persuade them to implement
through local organisations. The LTTE exerts this pressure through the NGO
consortia and pressure on local agency staff, as well as through meetings
between the LTTE leadership and the agencies in the Vanni. Despite this
pressure, all the agencies have what they call ‘working relationships’ with the
LTTE which involve different degrees of communication and dialogue with the
LTTE. Some agencies, such as UNHCR, actively seek a dialogue with the LTTE.
Other agencies prefer to avoid contact with LTTE as much as possible.
Negotiations and compromise
Negotiations and compromise is a strategy which agencies employ to manage
their day to day relationship with the combatants. This strategy is based on the
existence of an area of common interests between the agencies and the
combatants. As pointed out by the head of one of the agencies:
I draw this little picture. This is the government’s interest. It is big. It is
omnipresent, especially in Sri Lanka. An NGOs interest is smaller and
parts of it overlap. Where we can work with the government is where we
overlap. Where we can go into the uncleared area a force to be reckoned
with is the LTTE. Believe it or not, the interests of the government and the
LTTE overlap. There is food. There is agriculture. The only place where
we can operate in the uncleared areas is where all the three of those
intersect...and it always changes. When it is peace that area gets bigger.
Agencies respond to pressure from the LTTE by engaging in dialogue or
negotiations with the LTTE at different levels, depending on the issue.
Negotiations often take place with the political leadership. The outcome of the
negotiations falls into three categories. Firstly, a compromise may be reached
between the agencies and the LTTE whereby the agencies, for example, agree to
implement certain projects through TRO. Secondly, faced with unacceptable
pressure, agencies may decide to withdraw from a local area until the LTTE
accepts agency conditions. Thirdly, agencies resist LTTE pressure and the LTTE
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backs down. Another approach to LTTE pressure is to avoid being pressurised in
the first place by designing ‘unattractive’ projects. This means that the projects do
not involve resources which are attractive to the LTTE.
On some occasions the agencies have confronted not only pressure, but
incompatible demands from the two parties to the conflict. When hundreds of
thousands of people were displaced from the Jaffna peninsula and into the Vanni
following the government’s offensive against Jaffna town in the fall of 1995, the
LTTE pressed for long term agency operations in the Vanni. The government only
wanted temporary aid in the Vanni and prioritised rehabilitation in Jaffna. At the
time, the agencies chose not to start any long term rehabilitation activities in the
Vanni. Neither did they start any large scale operations in Jaffna.
An example of how potential reactions from the combatants may stifle agency
action and lead to inaction, as predicted by Scott (1995) is given in the quote
below:
What we have not been able to do is to study those household coping
strategies. We have not known exactly how to do that. The other is...it is
very political. All of a sudden you start telling that this has been going
down. The LTTE is going to want this to go this way, and the government
wants to argue that it is up this way (refers to chart).
As this quote demonstrates, some agencies have been careful in terms of
researching and describing the situation knowing that the results will be
controversial. As a result, the agencies’ work has been based on less accurate
information then it would have been, if the agencies had risked going into these
controversial issues.
Managing the relationships: a ‘balancing act’
All of the agencies claim that they adhere to the principles of impartiality and
neutrality in their work. Of these two concepts, the concept of impartiality seems
to be the most straightforward to operationalise. Impartiality relates to the
relationship between the agencies and their beneficiaries. It means that aid should
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be provided on the basis of need only, without taking into account any other
factors, like race, sex, age, beliefs, etc. Neutrality is important in defining the
relationship between the combatants and the agencies, and it is a much more
problematic concept to operationalise. However, a key element is not to take
sides in the conflict. In other words, to balance the relationship to the two sides.
The way in which the agencies conduct their field operations is one element in the
operationalisation of neutrality which I discuss below.
All of the agencies agree that an important aspect of maintaining neutrality is to
work with both the Sinhalese and the Tamil communities. So, for example,
agencies, such as Oxfam, Forut and UNHCR, which started out by working only in
the North have all established programmes in Sinhalese areas as well.
Secondly, all the agencies agree that transparency is important in the sense that
the government and the LTTE should be kept informed about the activities of the
agencies. The emphasis on transparency also prevents misunderstandings
between the agencies and the combatants.
Thirdly, agencies have different policies in terms of how they implement their
projects and programmes. Only two of the agencies working in the North of Sri
Lanka are self-implementing: Forut and ICRC. Both of these agencies argue that
self-implementation is a necessary requirement for remaining neutral vis à vis the
combatants. The other agencies argue that by implementing through local
organisations they help build local capacity. They also argue that funds that are
channelled through local organisations are closely monitored. UNHCR and Care
are the two largest agencies operating in the North and also the two agencies
which routinely implement through TRO. Both these organisations argue that they
implement through TRO for effectiveness reasons. Oxfam has also implemented
through TRO, but only as an exception from the general policy of trying to avoid
NGOs which are closely linked to the LTTE.
Fourthly, the agencies have had different policies in terms of how they should
work with rehabilitation in areas which have come under government control after
having been held by the LTTE. ICRC argues that it would be contrary to the
principle of neutrality if the organisation were to start rehabilitation work in areas
which had been formerly held by the LTTE, like Jaffna. Oxfam and Redd Barna
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have had different reasons for not starting work in Jaffna. Oxfam did not feel any
need to balance its portfolio by going into more projects in government-held
areas.  Redd Barna could not accept the conditions laid down by the government
which went contrary to Redd Barna policies.
At last, the issue of whether or not the agencies have employed expatriate staff is
important. It is assumed by the agencies that expatriates are in a better position to
resist pressure from the LTTE. In line with their policies of transferring
responsibility to local staff, both Redd Barna and Forut have had a policy of
having very limited expatriate staff in their office in Colombo. The other agencies
have employed expatriate staff in the field to a much larger degree.
Table 1: Operationalising neutrality and impartiality
issues UNHCR Oxfam SCF Forut RB ICRC Care
balance ethnicity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
implementation PS PS PS S PS S PS
TRO yes yes * no no no yes
rehabilitation
Jaffna
yes no * yes * no yes
resettlement
Vanni
yes no no no no no no
expatriates yes yes yes no no yes ?
* Empty spaces mean that this is not applicable to the agency. In the case of
rehabilitation this is because SCF and Redd Barna no longer do rehabilitation
work.
PS=partnership
S=self-implementing
Table 1 summarises the discussion about how agencies operationalise neutrality.
It shows that the agencies have different ways of operationalising neutrality in the
field. The only issue which all of them treat in the same way is balancing ethnicity
which means that all of them work with the Tamil as well as the Sinhalese
community.
UNHCR and the ICRC have adopted different  approaches on four out of the five
indicators above. Being self-implementing, ICRC does not become involved with
the combatants in implementing its relief programme while UNHCR works very
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closely both with the government and TRO. UNHCR seems to successfully
balance its close relationship to TRO, and frequent meetings with the LTTE,
through close collaboration with the government. Both agencies also have a
relatively large number of expatriate staff employed in the North and the East.
Another factor is that UNHCR and ICRC have by far the largest service delivery
programmes in the North and the East of Sri Lanka. Consequently, it is in the
government’s interest to maintain a good relationship with these two actors.
The two Norwegian NGOs differ from the other NGOs on two points: self-
implementation and the use of expatriate staff in the field. Forut, like the ICRC, is
the only other organisation that thinks that self-implementation is necessary to
remain neutral. During the time when it was doing relief work, Redd Barna was
also self-implementing. On the other hand, Care has relied on the opposite
strategy which has been to implement through TRO and local NGOs. The
government has been concerned about the lack of expatriate staff in the field
which was made a requirement for permits to work in Jaffna, after large areas of
the peninsula came under government control.
There are also other factors which are relevant to neutrality but which are not a
part of the field operations of the agencies. One point which was repeatedly
brought up by non-Norwegian NGOs was the ‘Norwegian connection’. The
Norwegian connection could be defined as the connection which Norwegian
NGOs have had to Norwegian aid policy, foreign policy and Norwegian refugee
policy. Norwegian foreign policy towards Sri Lanka has emphasised the need for
peace and reconciliation. There is also a relatively large Tamil community in
Norway. These two factors have been coupled together in the Sri Lankan media to
create an image of Norway as a country which would intervene in the peace
process on the Tamil side4.
Below I want to discuss advocacy as one way in which humanitarian agencies can
move beyond service delivery. I have argued above that service-delivery is based
on collaboration. Advocacy, on the other hand, increases the risk of confrontation
with the combatants.
10 ½Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian agencies
Advocacy: Risking Confrontation
Conflicts are often characterised by grave human rights violations. According to
the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata:
Violations of human rights are major - indeed, the major - cause of mass
population displacement. This fundamental relationship is not always
given adequate recognition... In many ways it would be more accurate to
describe refugees as people whose human rights have been seriously
violated or threatened (UNHCR 1995:58).
A fundamental change in agency policies took place in the early and mid-1990s.
SCF and Redd Barna changed their policies from having relief and development
at their core to a focus on children’s rights. Oxfam began to put more emphasis
on advocacy within the framework of Oxfam’s definition of basic rights. These
shifts have meant that the agencies have taken up a mandate which would
involve some degree of advocacy work as part of a strategy to promote children’s
rights or the rights of internally displaced people. The shift towards protection and
rights based issues have had implications for the role which the agencies play vis
à vis the combatants. From concentrating on service delivery, the agencies have
had to define an advocacy strategy, both at the local, national, and international
level. An advocacy role potentially brings the agencies into conflict with the
government and the LTTE as they work to promote the rights of their beneficiaries
and other war affected people. Forut has travelled a different path from the other
agencies as Forut has always had advocacy for human rights and peace as part
of its mandate. From early on in the conflict, Forut played an active role in
supporting peace and reconciliation efforts internationally, as well as being active
in the European NGO forum.
It is interesting to note that studies among displaced people have shown that they
think foreign agencies should play a role in terms of advocacy for peace. Some of
the local NGOs also state that they think that the foreign NGOs are in a position to
play an advocacy role in relation to the situation for internally displaced people
and that they should do so. Among the foreign NGOs there is a tendency to say
that the UN is in a better position to play an advocacy role then they are. In other
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words, the responsibility for advocacy and more confrontational politics is pushed
over to other organisations.
Within a humanitarian context, Médicins Sans Frontières defines advocacy in the
following way:
Being present among the victims and speaking out about their plight in
order to improve their basic living conditions and to protect their
fundamental human rights (Milliano 1996: 13).
As the above quote demonstrates, humanitarian agencies are often present
among the victims of violations of humanitarian and human rights law.
Consequently, they have access to information about these violations, and the
question which the agencies are faced with is: what should they do with this
information? What is the case in favour of advocacy?
One of the agencies working in Sri Lanka has argued for advocacy in the following
way:
Because if you only pursue one thing the chances are that you end up in
really dirty circumstances. That you are only delivering services, but you
fail to witness. But if you only witness and not deliver any services, what
is your legitimacy in the eyes of the local people who are suffering?
UNHCR has developed an overview of human rights and humanitarian law which
would be applicable to situations of internal displacements. UNHCR divides
human rights into two categories: rights which can be derogated and rights which
can not be derogated (UNHCR 1996).
Table 2: Non-derogable and derogable rights
non-derogable rights derogable rights
prohibitions against attack on civilians right not to be displaced
prohibitions against torture and cruel and
inhumane treatment
freedom of residence
right to food freedom of movement
prohibitions against disappearances right of return
right not to be detained/interned
12 ½Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian agencies
The Sri Lankan government is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in
which article three deals with internal armed conflict, but not to the Additional
Protocols of 1977 which treat internal armed conflict in more detail. The
Government has taken several legal and institutional steps to improve its human
rights record. However, following operation Riviresa to capture Jaffna in 1995,
extrajudiciary executions, “disappearances”, torture and arbitrary arrests
continued to take place under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency
Regulations (Amnesty International 1996).
In February 1988, the LTTE declared its commitment to act in accordance with
humanitarian law at all times. As for the LTTE’s pledge to abide by humanitarian
law, Amnesty International have listed a series of areas where the LTTE have
acted in breach of international human rights and humanitarian law (Amnesty
International 1995: 2). In connection with the visit, in May 1998, of the UN Special
Rapporteur on Children, Olara Otunnu, the LTTE leaders undertook to observe
the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and to refrain from
recruiting children or engaging them in combat. They also agreed not to impede
refugees to return to their home areas or to interfere with humanitarian aid (Sri
Lanka Monitor, May 1998: 4).
Advocacy strategies
The agencies have employed two main types of advocacy strategies. The first
strategy is lobbying of the combatants in Sri Lanka. The second strategy is
lobbying of international actors who presumably can apply pressure on the
combatants.
The first strategy, lobbying of the combatants, can be divided into three
approaches. Firstly, ‘protection by presence’ is based on the idea that the
presence of international field staff has a restraining influence on the combatants.
It is built on the assumption that the presence of agencies will deter violations of
human rights and humanitarian law by the combatants because agencies will
potentially act as an agent for people whose rights have been violated. The Open
Relief Centres run by UNHCR in Mannar and Pesalai are the most well known
13 ½Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian agencies
examples of this strategy. However, as its limitations became apparent, most
notably during the war in the former Yugoslavia (Safe Heavens), but also in Sri
Lanka, the concept has increasingly been questioned.
The second approach is direct lobbying of the government and of the LTTE
leadership. Agencies have lobbied the government to allow food supplies to areas
under LTTE control and on several occasions the agency interventions have been
successful. Agencies have also raised issues regarding forceful resettlement and
have  been able to prevent this from happening. In relation to the LTTE, UNHCR
has experienced two failed attempts at lobbying the LTTE into accepting
organised return of displaced people to Jaffna.
A third approach to advocacy is lobbying based on reports produced by the
agencies themselves. This is a strategy which has been used by Oxfam, SCF and
Redd Barna. Both SCF and Redd Barna have commissioned a range of studies
about key aspects of the situation of children in Sri Lanka, incorporating input
from children themselves. The quote below exemplifies how SCF has tried to
carve out a new role for itself through this process of gaining new knowledge
about the situation of children:
So much of the work that wehave done over the past couple of years,
although small, it has been able to better inform us as to the things that
come with the long term effects of the conflict. So we are positioning
ourselves to be authoritative perhaps, to try and pressurise people to try
and take something other than a short term approach to everything, and
hence our interest in education comes from work that started with this,
what we talked to communities about, what was important to them: water,
shelter, pots and pans did not come on top of the list. It was consistently
education. Families whose children have known nothing but the conflict
were thinking about the future of their children rather then the next night
in the shelter. So we tried to consistently produce material that reflect
what people are thinking.
In addition to general reporting on the rights of children, both organisations also
report in relation to the Child Rights Convention. This reporting takes place
through the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies based in Colombo and the
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Child Rights Group within the Consortium. The objective of this reporting is not
only to assess the government’s performance, but it is also to build knowledge
which can provide a basis for further action by both NGOs and the government.
The quote below explains the importance of the Child Rights Convention to the
advocacy work of these agencies:
It provides us with backing. I think the Convention is the most useful tool
that we have. When so many countries have signed up, they are
accountable in a way. We are justified in telling a government: you have
signed the convention and the report is due by Christmas. What kind of
assistance do you need in order to finalise the report? We have helped
writing many reports complementing government reports and we have
also helped governments produce reports when they have had insufficient
capacity.
In most cases, the agencies do not go public with their information but prefer to
work informally. Only the ICRC has developed relatively clear guidelines as to
when they should go public. According to the guidelines, the ICRC must have
been a direct witness to ensure absolute certainty about the facts which are being
reported, a breach of humanitarian law must have taken place, it must be serious,
it must be repeated, and the intervention must not affect the victims.5  However,
the ICRC’s main criteria seem to be whether speaking up will help the victims
concerned (Sommaruga 1997: 7, Sandoz 1992: 225). One aspect of this is an
assessment of the risk that the ICRC will be denied access to the victims, in
serious cases thrown out of the country, leaving the victims even more vulnerable
than before.
When the Sri Lankan army bombed Navaly church in the Jaffna-peninsula on July
9, 1995 resulting in the deaths of over one hundred people6, the ICRC went out
publicly with a carefully worded statement which not directly mentioned either the
government nor the LTTE. It expressed its concern ‘by the series of violent acts
that have claimed innocent victims’ and called upon the parties ‘to respect civilian
lives, property and places of refuge’ (ICRC 1995). The government countered
both by disputing the facts, arguing that it was not a direct hit on the church, but in
the churchyard, and by fuelling a harsh press campaign against the ICRC. The
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ICRC-government relationship became strained for months and the ICRC had a
difficult time operating.
Like the ICRC, other agencies have faced severe obstacles from the government
when attempting to implement an advocacy mandate. These constraints have
mainly taken two forms. One has been direct government interventions with
agencies whereby the government has told agencies that it disapproves of their
activities. The other has been statements by government spokespersons in the
media which dispute the facts of a matter as they have been presented by the
agencies. The responses of the government have subtly challenged the reliability
of agency information and the legitimacy of their actions. These confrontations
between the government and the agencies have resulted in periods of strained
relations between them. The implicit threat which the agencies have faced is that
the government would deny them access to displaced people in the Vanni or that
it would deny them permits to work altogether. Therefore, it seems that the
agencies have been reluctant to place themselves in a position in which they have
had to confront the government.
The second advocacy strategy seems to be the one favoured by NGOs: to
provide information to and to lobby more powerful actors. This strategy could be
called ‘leverage politics’.7  As one respondent put it:
At the same time I think one of our tasks is to make available objective
information. We have international staff there, of course most of the
information comes from local staff which can be verified within limits.
Information then is made available to the international community, so a
lot of this information comes from us. Without us being directly involved.
It is up to the politicians to decide on action. Both sides are really looking
for the support of the people and they are both interested to be seen as
adhering to basic international standards.
The agencies have regularly briefed their own embassies in Sri Lanka as well as
their foreign ministries at home about the situation in the conflict areas. Forut and
Redd Barna have been members of the London based NGO Forum on Sri Lanka
which is an advocacy group for NGOs, both national and international, working in
Sri Lanka. Oxfam developed a strategy for passing on information about
16 ½Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian agencies
humanitarian and human rights issues to more powerful players, such as the UN,
the EU and donors.
The main arenas for international advocacy related to the conflict have been the
UN Human Rights Commission, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the annual meeting of the major
donors to the Sri Lankan government in Paris. The UN Human Rights
Commission first passed a resolution on Sri Lanka in 1987 in which it asked the
government to allow the ICRC to offer its services in Sri Lanka. The UN Sub-
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted
a resolution on Sri Lanka in 1984 (Whall 1995: 323). NGOs have raised both
peace and human rights issues on these occasions. They have urged the parties
to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as well as trying to make donors make
their aid programs conditional on the human rights performance of the Sri Lankan
government.
Advocacy: making it work
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998) advocacy work requires a clear cognitive
frame within which an issue can be defined and explained to a target audience. A
cognitive frame serves to show that a given state of affairs can be changed
through identifying the responsible parties and suggesting credible solutions. If
one looks at advocacy issues which have been projected by the humanitarian
agencies in Sri Lanka, they fall into three categories: i) humanitarian issues
connected to the delivery of assistance to war affected people ii) human rights
issues like forceful resettlement, disappearances and problems related to birth
certificates and documentation iii) issues which are associated with the peace
question.
Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that an actor who is vulnerable is more likely to
respond to advocacy pressure. They discuss vulnerability as a result of aid
dependency as the most common type of vulnerability. The Sri Lankan
government has to a certain degree been vulnerable in this respect and the
annual donor meeting in Paris has provided a focus for NGO advocacy. However,
by far the largest two donors, Japan and the Asian Development Bank, have not
been targeted. When it comes to the potential for applying leverage and
accountability vis à vis the LTTE this is much more limited. Being a largely self-
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reliant guerrilla group, raising funding through taxation and trade, the LTTE is not
dependent on any large donors which are accessible to advocacy pressure.
As for accountability politics, only states are signatories to human rights law while
humanitarian law is binding both for states and for non-state actors. LTTE is,
therefore, bound by humanitarian law and it has publicly stated that it will abide by
humanitarian law. However, in practice, LTTE argues that humanitarian concerns
are secondary to military imperatives, and that the group has limited resources to
spend on ensuring that humanitarian law is upheld.8  On the other hand, the Sri
Lankan army has a hierarchical structure whose top and intermediary leadership
is accessible to advocacy efforts and whose rank and file can be brought together
for training. LTTE has a much smaller number of mid-level officers, its rank and
file is much less accessible and the leader, Prabakaran, has only been seen once
by the ICRC, and not at all by representatives of the NGOs.10  Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have drawn attention to human rights
abuses by the LTTE and one of their sources is NGOs operating in these areas
(Amnesty International 1996, Human Rights Watch/Asia 1995). So, although the
LTTE is not formally accountable in relation to human rights law, as far as the
LTTE is concerned with its image and international position it is presumably
vulnerable to human rights criticisms.
Based on the discussion above it is possible to deduct that an optimal situation for
successful advocacy would be a situation characterised by an issue which is
humanitarian in character, a cognitive frame consisting of an international
convention and a compatible, national belief system, a target which is integrated
into the international community to allow for leverage politics to be employed, and
possibly sanctions to be imposed, and a target which has made commitments
either to international legal instruments or to national law. If one compares the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE on these characteristics, it becomes evident
that an advocacy strategy vis à vis the government is more likely to succeed than
an advocacy strategy vis à vis the LTTE. This is because the government has
signed up to binding international, legal instruments. The government is
integrated into the international community of states. As a recipient of aid, the
government is also vulnerable to pressure from donor governments and
organisations. In 1997 and 1998, the United Kingdom was the fourth largest donor
of development aid to Sri Lanka, providing US$16 million. Norway was the fifth
18 ½Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian agencies
largest donor, providing US$15 million.10  Sri Lanka received a total of US$ 329
million in official development assistance in 1997 and US$ 490 million in 1998
(OECD 2000). As a guerrilla organisation, the LTTE is only committed to limited
sections of international humanitarian law and there is little scope for leverage
politics as LTTE is not dependent on funding from any governments or
international organisations.
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Neutrality: a barrier to advocacy?
The reason which is often given against taking up advocacy work, is that
advocacy is not compatible with maintaining a neutral position. The argument is
that advocacy could be perceived as taking sides or engaging in controversy. One
of the organisations in the study put it in the following terms:
...very sensitive ground because you never get it right. The Sri Lankan
government will say you are siding with the Tamils, the Tamils will say
you are siding with the government.
The findings from Sri Lanka do not support the idea that neutrality is on the
retreat. Rather all of the agencies emphasise their desire to remain neutral based
on an operational definition of neutrality. Neutrality is seen as an instrument to
achieve delivery of assistance within an environment which at times is perceived
as hostile. The efforts which agencies make to balance their relationships to the
combatants, in such a way that they are not perceived to be taking sides in the
conflict, reflect this understanding of the concept of neutrality. While holding on to
the concept of neutrality, agencies have explored avenues for advocacy.
Firstly, the basis for their advocacy work has been their mandates which reflect
international laws and conventions, or it has been the particular knowledge which
they have gained through their access to the conflict areas. Secondly, their
advocacy has been strictly linked to the consequences that the actions of the
combatants have for their beneficiaries. Thirdly, the agencies also keep a low
profile and they tend to ‘decouple’11 advocacy work from their service delivery
work. These strategies have worked in terms of maintaining neutrality in the sense
that the agencies in general have been able to continue their service delivery
work in the conflict areas.
MSF and ICRC are the strongest exponents of the strategies of using their
mandates and knowledge obtained through their work in conflict areas as a way of
combining advocacy and service delivery work. I briefly discussed ICRC above.
The MSF model is to make advocacy an integral part of service delivery work. On
the relationship between advocacy and service delivery, the MSF view is that
advocacy is an integral part of service delivery:
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Advocacy is an integral part of our humanitarian mission. Therefore we do
not talk about populations in need. We prefer to describe them as
populations in danger. The concept of danger indicates that people should
be protected against violence and human rights abuses. If they are not,
then aid can easily be part of the repressive policies that have caused this
suffering in the first place. Aid agencies have to be aware of the
permanent danger of becoming government sub-contractors (Milliano
1996: 13).
In implementing its mandate in Sri Lanka, MSF Sri Lanka states that: ‘We say
what we are doing and what we are seeing’. When MSF witnessed violations of
humanitarian law in, for example in September 1995 and July 1997, the
organisation publicised the violations through press releases. MSF reporting vis à
vis humanitarian law is based on medical evidence collected by MSF field staff
and lobbying carried out by MSF is also based on medical evidence. As for
human rights issues, MSF hands information on to the ICRC. MSF emphasises
the need for absolute transparency vis à vis the combatants. In other words, MSF
keeps the combatants informed about their work while also making public
instances of violations of humanitarian law committed by the combatants. MSF
has developed the concept of ‘active impartiality’ to describe advocacy work (Slim
1997b). Equally important is MSF’s emphasis on transparency in relation to the
combatants as a way of ensuring that they are perceived as neutral. The MSF
approach to combining service delivery and advocacy was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1999, as the Nobel Committee acknowledged the merits of
combining service delivery work with advocacy.
What then are the policy implications for other NGOs of the approaches of the
MSF and ICRC? Through a combination of transparency, and of basing their
advocacy work on medical evidence, MSF manages to achieve its dual objectives
of service delivery and advocacy. ICRC’s advocacy work is based on
humanitarian law and observance of the organisation’s rules for when and how
advocacy should be carried out. The best measure of the ability of these two
organisations to remain neutral in the eyes of the combatants is probably their
continued work in Sri Lanka for over ten years. In other words, based on carefully
developed principles and balanced in relation to all parties to the conflict,
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advocacy and service delivery have been combined in the field. Could this model
be adopted by NGOs and the UNHCR as well? MSF and ICRC provide services
which may be considered of a more urgent nature than some services provided by
NGOs. MSF and ICRC have a strong focus on medical services which may be
seen by the combatants as less dispensable than, for example, income generating
projects. The government may therefore tolerate more in terms of advocacy from
these two organisations than from smaller NGOs. However, what NGOs and the
UNHCR can learn from these two models is that an advocacy policy has to be
carefully designed and planned by the organisation and potentially negative
consequences for the organisation have to be assessed.
Organisational Issues
When agencies take up advocacy they become vulnerable to criticism from the
combatants. The agencies in Sri Lanka have applied a range of responses to
minimise their vulnerability.
Organisational responses: knowledge, ‘decoupling’,  alliances and transparency
Advocacy is inherently political work. Keck and Sikkink (1998) use the word
advocacy politics and talk about different types of advocacy politics. When the
organisation which is doing advocacy and the advocacy target have different
goals, advocacy may lead to conflict between the two. Therefore, an organisation
which is doing advocacy work often finds that its relationship to the environment is
very different from an organisation which is doing service delivery work. What are
the implications for organisational structure and behaviour of these different types
of relationships to the environment?
Firstly, when organisations take up advocacy work, one component of this work is
information politics as discussed by Keck and Sikkink (1998). The need for
organisations to collect reliable information leads them to emphasise knowledge
and knowledge creation as an important aspect of their work. Sometimes this
approach is based on an acknowledgement that the organisation does not in fact
know much about its beneficiaries. Developing a knowledge based organisation
involves collecting information about relevant issues, and how they can be
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defined, within the local context as well as taking on new staff or training existing
staff. Building a knowledge based organisation may happen within the framework
of an already existing structure, or it may involve radical changes in structure. The
latter approach was developed by Redd Barna and, to some extent SCF, when
their organisational policies changed to a focus on children’s rights and large
service delivery oriented programmes were abandoned.
Secondly, several of the organisations have ‘decoupled’ advocacy work from
service delivery work. This is the model which is most widely prescribed in the
literature as a means of managing pressure from the environment (Meyer and
Scott 1992, Brunsson 1988, Elsbach and Sutton 1992). According to this model,
only very limited and discreet advocacy work is carried out in the country of
conflict, and a more active role is played by the organisation abroad. The
advocacy work carried out abroad could be either on specific issues related to the
conflict in Sri Lanka, as has been the case with advocacy work carried out by
Oxfam and Forut, or it could be on more general issues as has been the case with
the advocacy work carried out by the ICRC. However, Forut’s experience has
demonstrated that the strategy of carrying out advocacy abroad does not work in
terms of avoiding controversy if information about the advocacy work abroad is
fed into the country of conflict and ends up in the public domain.
Thirdly, I have argued that transparency is a strategy which is used by all of the
agencies to maintain a constructive relationship with the combatants. As a staff
member of MSF in Sri Lanka said: ‘We say what we are doing and what we are
seeing.’ In addition to regular meetings and reporting to the combatants, which are
activities that all the agencies carry out, Red Cross has taken transparency a step
further by publishing its own newsletter in Sri Lanka, as well as explaining its work
in the national newspapers to reach a broader constituency. The emphasis which
the agencies place on transparency, provision of information and dialogue with
the combatants, is surprising in the context of organisational theory. Pfeffer and
Salancik have argued that:
... organisations attempt to avoid influence and constraint by restricting
the flow of information about them and their activities, denying the
legitimacy of demands made upon them, diversifying their dependencies,
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and manipulating information to increase their own legitimacy (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978: 261).
The organisations in this study provide the combatants with information about
their activities for at least three reasons. Firstly, to pre-empt allegations that they
are not impartial and neutral. Secondly, to use as a defence in case they are
accused of inappropriate activities and, thirdly, to build legitimacy for their work.
So, contrary to Pfeffer and Salancik’s argument, organisations under pressure
supply information about themselves and their activities to key actors rather than
restricting it. Providing information serves the purposes of projecting and
protecting the image of the organisation. By continually providing information,
agencies attempt to persuade other actors that the activity is proper and that the
organisation is a valid practitioner. These are the two elements which Suchmann
(1995) defines as part of a strategy to build legitimacy. Institutional theory
suggests that gaining legitimacy from the environment is a key organisational
concern which may impact both on organisational structure and action.12
Fourthly, foreign humanitarian agencies are susceptible to criticism exactly
because they are foreign and primarily accountable to Western donors and their
home constituencies. One lesson which is reflected in much writing about
advocacy work is the need for alliances with parties both inside and outside the
NGO sector. Alliances may be with the business sector, churches or trade unions
(Hall 1992, Covey 1995). This idea may be particularly pertinent to foreign
humanitarian agencies. In the Sri Lankan context, the importance of alliances
between civil society and sensitive agents inside the establishment has been
pointed out (Weerakoon 1997). The NGOs working in Sri Lanka have until
recently not entered into alliances with organisations outside the NGO sector.
However, this is changing with Redd Barna’s and Save the Children’s advocacy
work. They are developing relationships with civil society institutions, such as
research institutions and advocacy groups on children’s rights. One pronounced
aim of this policy is to give legitimacy to the advocacy work that is carried out on
child rights issues. Oxfam, Forut and SCF have adopted the strategy of trying to
link up with the views of their beneficiaries through different processes whereby
the views of their beneficiaries are sought. However, the agencies have not taken
the next logical step which would be to change their policies so that they would
become more compatible with the views of their beneficiaries. UNHCR, Forut and
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SCF are the organisations which have most explicitly decided to work with the
government in particular areas, either out of necessity or based on the idea of
scaling up. All these strategies are based on a need to strengthen links between
agencies and their environment so that they can become more effective and also
increase their legitimacy.
Concluding remarks
As organisations move from service delivery to advocacy the potential for
confrontation with the combatants increases. Similarly, as organisations move
from humanitarian aid and towards rehabilitation, human rights and peace, goals
become less overlapping and the potential for confrontation increases. Moving in
this direction increases the potential for conflict. However, if human rights and
peace work is implemented as services, such as training programmes, the
potential for conflict becomes less. This is an approach which has been adopted
widely by, for example, the ICRC which has implemented extensive training
programmes for the Sri Lankan army on humanitarian law.
Table 3: From service delivery to advocacy: increased confrontation
role/goals humanitarian rehabilitation human rights     peace
service
delivery
        A        B        C        D
advocacy         E        F        G        H
As agencies move towards the right in Table 3 to a situation where human rights
and peace issues become more prominent on the agenda, the potential for
confrontation with the combatants increases. Similarly, as their role changes from
service delivery to advocacy this change also increases the potential for
confrontation. For example, activities which fall within box A, service delivery of
humanitarian aid, are less controversial then activities within box H: advocacy on
the peace issue. This combination makes peace issues hard to tackle for foreign
NGOs. The agencies in Sri Lanka have developed a range of organisational
responses to manage the tensions between service delivery and advocacy. They
include building a knowledge based organisation, decoupling, transparency and
alliance building.
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What are the lessons which the international NGO community can draw from
these discussions? First of all, the experience from Sri Lanka demonstrates that it
is possible to combine advocacy with neutrality, although it requires a fine
balancing act from the agencies. Strong forces are pushing relief NGOs in the
direction of advocacy, most notably a demand from their Southern counterparts
and even from their beneficiaries. Secondly, combining advocacy and service
delivery constitutes an organisational challenge which the agencies have to
tackle. In addition to the challenges which have been listed above, the question of
the qualifications and training of agency staff is important.
More research is needed on the advocacy strategies of humanitarian agencies in
complex political emergencies. One possible design could trace advocacy efforts
from the local and national level and through to the international level using a
multilevel, possibly comparative, approach.
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Notes
1. Professor Fred Halliday, seminar at LSE, March 1997
 
2. Examples of work towards developing a code of conduct include ‘Principles of
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’ developed by the Steering Committee for
Humanitarian response in 1993. The NGOs involved were Caritas International,
Catholic Relief Services, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Lutheran
World Federation, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. The Mohonk
Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies were developed by
the New York based World Conference on religion and Peace.
 
3. This is a paragraph from a memorandum written by one of the NGOs to a
donor.
 
 
4. Island May 26 1997, Sunday Times July 27 1997
 
 
5. Interview with agency staff (22)
 
 
6. Based on figures from Human Rights Watch Asia (1995), p. 1
 
 
7. This concept was developed by Keck and Sikkink in their book: Activists
beyond borders (1998)
 
8. Interview with agency staff (23)
 
 
9. Interview with ICRC staff
 
 
10. Japan provided US$ 166 million, the Asian Development Bank Special Funds
provided  US$ 92 million and IDA provided US$ 76 million.
 
11. The most used form of ‘decoupling’ is to assign advocacy to the head office.
 
 
12. Institutional theory is one strand of organisational theory.
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